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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., ) 
a Utah limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff-Appellant ) 
vs ) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah body ) 
politic and political ) 
subdivision of the State of ) ORAL ARGUMENT 
Utah, ) REQUESTED 
Defendant-Appellee ) Docket No. 20100923SC 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is granted in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 78A-3a-102(3)(j), 
Utah Code. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal (and the predicate factual situation 
surrounding it) presents the following issues for review: 
1. That the COUNTY had no costs (namely, expenses 
for capital improvements for State Road 171) 
mandates judgment in favor of the Plaintiff B.A.M. 
DEVELOPMENT. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's conclusions of 
law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness. 
United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park 
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme 
1 
Court 1993) . This standard of review has also been 
referred to as a "correction of error standard". 
Jacobsen Investment Company vs State Tax 
Commission, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 
1992). "Correction of error" means that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's 
ruling on questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah Supreme Court 1994). The 
"correction of error" standard means that the 
appellate court decides the matter for itself and 
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law. Howell vs Howell, 8 06 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993). 
Presented to trial court: Plaintiff's CLOSING 
ARGUMENT, dated 4 June 2010. RECORD at pp. 822-
839. 
2. Exactions pursuant to the highway-abutting 
Ordinance are unconstitutional. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: See above. BAM III, Dolan. 
Presented to trial court: Plaintiff's CLOSING 
ARGUMENT, dated 4 June 2010. RECORD at pp. 822-
839. 
3. The trial court erred in its disregard of 
"Just Compensation Clause" principles, per Nollan 
(USSCt 1987), Dolan (USSCt 1994), Banberry 
2 
Development (Utah Supreme Court 1981: 
"constitutional standard of reasonableness"), 
B.A.M. Development III (2008) and related cases 
under state and national constitutional 
provisions, and the application of those 
principles ["rough equivalence" of "costs to the 
County" and exactions must consider "taxes paid"] 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. See Subparagraph 1, above. 
Presented to trial court: Plaintiff's CLOSING 
ARGUMENT, dated 4 June 2010. RECORD at pp. 822-
839. 
5. The trial court erred in its misconstruing and 
misapplying Plaintiff's "inverse condemnation" 
claim for compensation, as per the filed 
pleadings, regardless of the "appeal" to the Salt 
Lake County Board of Commissioners which refused 
to even hear the appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. See Subparagraph 1, above. 
Presented to trial court: Plaintiff's CLOSING 
ARGUMENT, dated 4 June 2010. RECORD at pp. 822-
839. 
6. The trial court committed prejudicial error in 
refusing to receive and consider "rebuttal expert 
witness" testimony from B.A.M.'s "expert" ["burden 
of proof" under Dolan] 
3 
Presented to trial court: TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH 
TRIAL, 27 May 2010. Page 216, Lines 14-17. 
7. Appellant's "notice of appeal" was filed 
timely within the "extended" time-period, per the 
post-trial motions not finally resolved by the 
trial court. [Reserved, from "summary disposition" 
motion filed by Appellee COUNTY.] 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
FIFTH AMENDMENT TO UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
. private property shall not be taken for 
public use without just compensation 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEEN AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; . . . not deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
UTAH IMPACT FEES ACT 
[Section 11-36-102, Utah Code: "Definitions"] 
(13) (a) "Roadway facilities" means streets or 
roads that have been designated on an officially 
adopted subdivision plat, roadway plan, or general 
plan of a political subdivision, together with all 
necessary appurtenances. 
(b) "Roadway facilities" includes associated 
improvements to federal and state roadways only 
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when the associated improvements: 
(i) are necessitated by the new 
development; and 
(ii) are not funded by the state or 
federal government• 
(c) "Roadway facilities" does not mean federal or 
state roadways. 
[INTERPRETATION/APPLICATION/SIGNIFICANCE TO CASE: 
Local governments are allowed to have a "road 
impact fee" which the COUNTY does not but the 
"road impact fee" may not be based upon nor fund 
improvements to federal or state roadways.] 
STATE TRANSPORTATION CODE 
[Section 72-4-123(1), Utah Code] 
72-4-123 State highways SR-171 to SR-174, 
SR 178, SR-180. 
State highways include: 
(1) SR-171. From Route 111 at Eighty-
fourth West Street and Thirty-fifth South 
Street easterly on Thirty-fifth South 
Street and Thirty-third South Street to 
Route 215 at the east-side of belt route. 
Emphasis added. 
HIGHWAY ABUTTING ORDINANCE 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
15.28.010 Dedication and improvement required. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.20, 
no building or structure shall be erected, 
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged, 
and no building permit shall be issued therefor, 
on any lot or parcel which abuts a major or 
secondary highway, as shown on the map entitled, 
"Official Major and Secondary Highway Plan, Salt 
Lake County," on file with the development 
services division and made part of this chapter by 
reference, or other public street with does not 
conform to current county width standards, unless 
the portion of such lot or parcel within the 
right-of-way of the highway to be widened or 
additional required street width has been 
dedicated to the county and improved. The 
dedication and improvements shall meet the 
standards for such highway or street as provided 
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in Section 15.28.060. [Ord 961 § 1 (part), 1986: 
prior code § 2-6-1] 
EXHIBIT 8 [2001 BENCH TRIAL, April 2001]. Emphasis 
added. [ATTACHMENT #1 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an "inverse condemnation" case, filed pursuant 
to the "self-executing" provisions of the Utah Constitution 
[Article I, Section 22], to recover monies for the 
unconstitutionally "excessive" development "exact ions" 
imposed by Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY pursuant to the 
"highway-abutting Ordinance". [This case is not a "land-use 
appeal" (such as from a legislative action involving 
rezoning of real estate or the denial of a land-use by a 
local government).] 
State Road 171 is a state highway. Section 72-4-123 (1) , 
Utah Code. Utah Department of Transportation [UDOT] is 
responsible that State Roadway.. 
In 1998 the Plaintiff B.A.M. owned a 15-acre parcel, 
the northern boundary of which extended "to the centerline 
of the roadway" (namely, State Road 171), of which 
approximately 17 feet thereof was paved with asphalt and 
used for vehicular traffic purposes. 
In 1998 SALT LAKE COUNTY required pursuant to its 
"highway-abutting Ordinance" and as a condition of 
development approval the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT to 
dedicate and improve the entire 53-foot "half-width" of 
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State Road 171 immediately adjacent to and at the northern 
boundary of its 15-acre "Westridge Meadows subdivision", 
consisting ultimately of 44 "building lots" for single-
family residential dwellings. 
Following the rejection by the governing body of the 
COUNTY of the developer's request to "appeal" the 
administrative requirement (per the Ordinance) to dedicate 
and improve the State Road 171 right-of-way, the developer 
filed this action in August 1998 to challenge the dedication 
and improvement requirement. 
In August 1999 one year after the litigation was 
filed and with that litigation in play the COUNTY finally 
approved the development of the 44-lot subdivision and 
required the previously-decided exactions. The 1999 "value" 
of the dedication Plaintiff owned the real estate "to the 
centerline" of the existing roadway and the improvements 
was $391,000+ (1999 values). [Of that amount, approximately 
$88,000 were for roadway and related improvements 
(underground stormsewer line upsizing and relocation, and so 
forth), unrelated to any impact actually created by B.A.M.'s 
project, but nevertheless required by the COUNTY.] 
In October 2008, following the third substantive 
"appeal" to the Utah appellate courts, the Utah Supreme 
Court rendered its decision the herein-designated "B.A.M. 
Ill" decision remanding the case back to the District 
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Court for correct application of the "rough equivalence" 
standard under Dolan. 
In May 2010 the District Court held a three-day bench 
trial, ultimately ruling in favor of the COUNTY and 
dismissing Plaintiff's claims. Following the District 
Court's denial of timely-filed post-trial motions (for new 
trial and to enter additional "findings"), this appeal was 
filed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has retained jurisdiction of the 
appeal. 
This case has been the subject of three former appeals. 
"BAM Development I": 2004 UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710 
(Utah App 2004) 
"BAM Development II": 2006 UT 2, 128 P.3d 1161 
(Utah 2006) . 
"BAM Development III": 2008 UT 74, 196 P. 3d 601 
(Utah 2008) . 
SUMMARIES OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
The arguments of Appellant B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT are 
summarized as follows: 
1. The fact that the COUNTY has no "costs" 
(capital improvements expenses) associated with 
the State Road 171 roadway mandates judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, in 
accordance with B.A.M. III. 
2. The COUNTY-required exactions (dedication and 
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installation of improvements) pursuant to the 
"highway-abutting Ordinance" are unconstitutional 
in their application (i.e. the exactions are 
required of only "highway-abutting" parcels, while 
development of similarly-situated parcels creating 
the same "impact" are exempt from such exaction) . 
3. The trial court erred in failing to consider 
and follow the provisions of Banberry Development 
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 8 99 
(Utah Supreme Court 1981) ["constitutional 
standard of reasonableness" predicated upon 7-
element test: "taxation" sources must be 
considered for exactions] in its effect upon the 
in-kind "exactions". 
4. The trial court erred in considering only a 
portion of Plaintiff's Dolan (constitutionally 
"excessive") claims, as framed by Plaintiff's 
pleadings actually filed before the subdivision 
development was approved.FOOTNOTE1 
5. The trial court erred in refusing to receive 
the offered testimony of the Plaintiff's "expert 
rebuttal witness", in contradiction to the 
procedural and burden of proof mandates of Dolan. 
xDolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309 
(USSCt 1994), hereinafter "Dolan". 
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6. The Appellant's timely-filed post-trial 
motions extended the time for filing the "notice 
of appeal", in accordance with long-established 
and widely-accepted provisions of the Rules, 
reasonably relied upon by counsel. [ISSUE RESERVED 
FROM APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, 
December 2010] 
ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff preliminarily notes that almost the 
entirety of the Defendant's "defense" at this stage is 
unalterably tied to and predicated upon the COUNTY'S novel, 
creative but nevertheless incorrect "extension" and 
interpretation of the Supreme Court's "cost to the County" 
language within B.A.M. Ill: that is, that the Supreme Court 
intended that the phrase "cost to the County" really had a 
more expansive meaning and application, namely, a "cost to 
the government". If the Supreme Court rejects that creative 
argument, the COUNTY essentially loses, as the COUNTY as 
an entity, as a "party" had no "costs". 
Even if the expanded "costs to the governments" is now 
allowed, the COUNTY still fails to prevail because within 
the May 2010 bench trial the requested opportunity for the 
COUNTY to present and prove its "costs to the County" 
claims the COUNTY still failed in its Dolan-based 
obligations to establish the legitimacy of the exactions, 
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particularly in light of the "taxation resources" issue 
(under Banberry), which must be part of the case if "costs 
to UDOT" are to be a factor in the case, actually tried, 
argued and ruled upon in the manner the COUNTY wanted. 
The "expansive" interpretation ("costs to the 
governments"), if granted by the Supreme Court, is 
nevertheless fatally flawed, by reason of the discriminatory 
effect imposed upon properties (and drivers) who are 
"highway-abutting" but have already, through fuel taxes and 
other taxes, paid for their impact, while others are exempt 
therefrom. [In case the Supreme Court is inclined to accept 
the COUNTY'S "costs to the governments" interpretative "re-
write" of B.A.M. Ill (of which the Court's clear "cost to 
the County" directive was relied upon), fairness would 
demand the case be remanded back to the District Court, for 
re-trial on the newly "re-written" standard.] 
The COUNTY'S opportunity to quibble with essentially 
what the COUNTY herein seeks to do the Supreme Court's 
"mandate" contained in B.A.M. Ill was in 2008 in its 
"petition for rehearing", to delete "Footnote #5" (which the 
COUNTY found offensive) . The COUNTY failed to then (in 2008) 
to request the text or substantive changes to B.A.M. Ill; 
the COUNTY should not now be heard to argue for such 
"expansive" change. 
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I 
THAT THE COUNTY HAS "NO COSTS" 
MANDATES JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR 
After more than ten years of litigation (including 
three substantive opinions of the appellate courts), the 
Utah Supreme Court remanding the case back to the District 
Court in B.A.M. Development III was absolutely clear as to 
what the District Court was to do. Those directives 
procedurally and substantively are contained within the 
closing paragraphs [12 and 13] and leave little room for 
doubt or interpretation as what the Supreme Court had 
developed and decided for the proper application of the 
Dolan "rough equivalence" standard, the Utah Supreme Court 
was precisely clear. The Court wrote: 
1|l2 After determining the cost to each party, the 
final step of the extent component of the Dolan 
analysis is simple: The trial court must determine 
whether the costs to each party are roughly 
equivalent. FOOTNOTE OMITTED. Because each factor 
is measured the same way, in dollars, this 
calculation should be very simple. If the two sums 
are about the same, they are roughly equivalent. 
H 13 With this framework in mind, applying the 
Dolan analysis becomes a relatively 
straightforward task. First, the trial court must: 
determine whether the exaction and impact are 
related in nature or whether the solution (the 
exaction) directly addresses the specific problem 
(the impact) . Second, the trial court must: 
determine what the cost of dealing with the impact 
would be to the County, absent any exaction; what 
the costs would be to the developer; and whether 
the two costs are roughly equivalent. 
2008 UT 74 at HH 12-13. Emphasis added. Footnote in original 
12 
text has been omitted. 
The May 2010 bench trial before Judge Toomey was, 
theoretically, the premier opportunity for the COUNTY to 
present its evidence and prove its claims on the "cost to 
the County" issue directed by this Court in B.A.M. III. 
Within that proceeding, the COUNTY produced NO such 
evidence: 
*NO physical evidence (checks, invoices paid, 
billings, contracts, ledgers or similar financial 
records) were offered as "evidence" of any "costs 
to the County" associated with any state roadway, 
let alone State Road 171. 
*NO hard evidence (interlocal agreements with UDOT 
or the State itself) was identified or offered as 
"evidence" of any obligation (contractual, 
statutory, "moral") for the COUNTY to be 
financially responsible for capital improvement 
expenses for any state roadway, let alone State 
Road 171. 
*the COUNTY, given that "premier opportunity" in 
which to present its case fully and completely 
failed even to put forward knowledgeable persons 
(for example, County auditors, County budgetary 
personnel, County public works or road engineers, 
or similar UDOT personnel) who would know about 
13 
such "costs to the County". The only witnesses the 
COUNTY put forward were two "expert witnesses" who 
actually (and admittedly) knew nothing of the 
"costs to the County" issue. 
By the conclusion of the bench trial, the COUNTY had 
not presented one scintilla of evidence of any "costs to the 
County, absent the exaction" as B.A.M, III required. The 
simple fact was true: the COUNTY had no such costs. 
This "no costs" situation which was always suspected 
and even understood by the Plaintiff and its counsel was 
always the case, throughout the 12-year "history" of the 
litigation. "Hard evidence" (i.e. answers to 
interrogatories, production of documents) of such "costs" 
would have been required to have been produced (by the 
COUNTY), pursuant to "continuing" requests for pre-trial 
"discovery", but no such "hard evidence" was ever provided. 
[The COUNTY didn't produce within "discovery" or at trial-
--"hard evidence" of such "costs", because there was no 
"hard evidence" thereof, for the simple reason that there 
were NO "costs".] Except for a single incident (18 December 
2009) when the COUNTY'S counsel attempting to avoid the 
then-imminent granting of summary judgment intentionally 
misrepresented the "the County has costs" to the specific 
inquiry of Judge Toomey the COUNTY has never claimed to 
have "costs" (i.e. actual expenses for capital improvements 
14 
to state highways).FOOTNOTE2 
The COUNTY produced during the May 2 010 bench trial two 
witnesses: Mr Dudley and Mr Nepstad, each supposedly 
qualified as an "expert". Mr Dudley, a developer, testified 
generally that the COUNTY'S exactions were reasonable and 
that B.A.M., like others, should expect to incur those 
exactions. Mr Nepstad, quite literally the COUNTY'S "star 
witness" (because he was engaged to present the "costs" 
evidence), was the County's concluding witness. 
During his direct testimony, Mr Nepstad did not offer 
Following Plaintiff's lengthy "oral argument" commentary on 
the COUNTY'S lack of "costs" for the State roadway and for 
which the COUNTY had filed a non-compliant response to the 
"summary judgment" (i.e. no sworn testimony by "affidavit" in 
opposition to Plaintiff's "sworn testimony" in affidavit that 
the County had no costs; no "verbatim restatement" of the 
Plaintiff's written "undisputed facts" in its supporting memo, 
as required by Rule 7(c)(3), U.R.C.P.), the District Court 
(Judge Toomey) "opened" the COUNTY'S responses to the "costs" 
discussion: 
COURT: Mr Christensen, is there a cost to the County? 
Mr CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, there are costs to the 
county. 
TRANSCRIPT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORAL ARGUMENTS HEARING, 18 
December 2009, page 15, lines 16-18. Emphasis added. 
Moments later Mr Christensen was to remark: 
Mr CHRISTENSEN: . . . Obviously we don't have a case 
if we say the county has no cost. . . . 
Transcript of summary judgment hearing, page 18, lines 23-24. 
Emphasis added. 
15 
any evidence testimonial or documentary as to any actual 
"costs" to the County as to financial responsibility for 
State [UDOT] roadways. Mr Nepstad did engage in a lengthy 
presentation, guided by the COUNTY'S counsel, as to the 
"possibility" conjectural and speculative for sure, and 
being "political" in nature, arguably outside the realm of 
his training and expertise that UDOT may, at some future 
time transfer "ownership" of State Road 171 to the COUNTY, 
which would then, but only then, be financially responsible 
for the capital improvements. TRANSCRIPT at Page 119, line 
23 through Page 123, line 18. 
That the COUNTY had NO "costs" was confirmed by his 
testimony on cross-examination: 
MR. HOMER: Mr. Nepstad, do you have any in your 
involvement with the county, do you have any 
evidence today that Salt Lake County has in the 
past, in other words, from 2010 backwards, has 
incurred any costs that would go to this portion 
of the state roadway? 
MR. NEPSTAD: Not that I'm aware of. 
MR. HOMER: Okay. Are you aware of any legal 
obligation currently existing that would make Salt: 
Lake County financially liable to incur costs for 
that roadway in the future, for example an inter-
local agreement contract or some other 
participatory contract? Are you aware of such a 
contractual obligation? 
MR. NEPSTAD: No. 
MR. HOMER: Are you aware of any statutory 
obligation? 
MR. NEPSTAD: No. 
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MR. HOMER: Okay. Under the law, if UDOT is the 
controlling jurisdiction, UDOT has the statutory 
responsibility financially for the UDOT roads, 
correct? 
MR. NEPSTAD: I don't know that to be honest. 
TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL, 27 May 2010, Page 177, Line 21 
through Page 178, Line 14. Names (not shown in Transcript) 
added for clarity. 
That Mr Nepstad the COUNTY'S "expert" witness does 
not "know" or have that information in his head or briefcase 
is not, per se, the issue. The lack of evidence, however, is 
critical because Mr Nepstad was, essentially, the COUNTY'S 
only witness on this "financial" issue. Thus, the COUNTY 
presented absolutely no evidence of any "costs" to it for 
capital improvements to the State Road 171. 
That the former "record" (including transcripts of the 
former "Judge Hansen" bench trials of 2001 and 2006) was 
arguably read by Judge Toomey is irrelevant: in the former 
trials there was absolutely no "evidence" (or even claim, by 
the COUNTY) as to any "costs" to the COUNTY (for the capital 
improvements for State Road 171) . 
The COUNTY has thus failed in its burden under Dolan 
and B.A.M. ill. 
Thus, the "bottom line" to any kind of "accounting" (or 
similar "balance sheet" as to "costs" in accordance with 
the Utah Supreme Court's clear directives in B.A.M. Ill 
must look something like this: 
17 
"Costs" for State Road 171 capital improvements: 
Costs to B.A.M. Development $391,000.00 
Costs to Salt Lake County 0.00 
"Excessive" (unconstitutional) exaction 
against B.A.M. Development $391,000.00 
Logic even common sense would dictate that with all 
of this litigation (3 appeals to the Utah appellate courts, 
with a fourth likely) and in the face of the clear directive 
(e.g. "mandate" as the case law describes it) of the Utah 
Supreme Court, the trial court would be most observant and 
careful to honor, at least in identification (if not 
application) the Supreme Court's "determine costs to the 
County" directive. [One would think the COUNTY would 
theoretically want the same "finding".] The Court, although 
requested to do so, didn't make such a "finding". The 
District Court's "non-finding" (sic) on this most critical 
issue is buried within the obscure text of FINDING OF FACT 
# 16, thus: 
16. The road-widening projects will likely be 
financed by a combination of government road 
construction funding sources, including federal 
highway funds and additional State, County, and/or 
municipal funds. 
RECORD at Page 904. Emphasis added. That "Finding" and it 
is the only one, even close to being on point falls 
"woefully short" of what B.A.M. Ill legitimately expected 
and requires. This is hardly the "unwavering fidelity to the 
letter and spirit of the mandate" (trial court to determine 
1 Q 
"costs to the County, absent any exaction") our appellate 
jurisprudence expects. See Campbell vs State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, 2004 UT 34, 1 5, 98 P. 3d 409. 
Emphasis added. 
The simple truth of the matter is: the County presented 
no evidence of "costs to the County", because it had no 
"costs to the County", whether so "found" or not. 
Because the County has "no costs", the Utah Supreme 
Court should direct the District Court to enter judgment for 
the Plaintiff in the amount of the $391,000, plus accruing 
interest thereto prejudgment interest at the statutory 
rate or prejudgment interest for "eminent domain" 
proceedings, whichever is higher. 
POINT II 
THE COUNTY-REQUIRED "TAKINGS" EFFECTED PURSUANT TO 
THE "HIGHWAY-ABUTTING ORDINANCE" 
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
In Dolan the United States Supreme Court reiterated: 
One of the principal purposes of the Takings 
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some 
people to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a 
whole." 
114 SCt at 2316. Emphasis added. 
The COUNTY'S legal position in defending the County-
required "exactions" imposed upon the Plaintiff B.A.M. 
DEVELOPMENT is premised entirely upon administrative 
decisions enforcing the provisions of the County's "highway-
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abutting Ordinance", which provides: 
15.2 8.010 Dedication and improvement required. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 15.28.20, 
no building or structure shall be erected, 
reconstructed, structurally altered or enlarged, 
and no building permit shall be issued therefor, 
on any lot or parcel which abuts a major or 
secondary highway, as shown on the map entitled, 
"Official Major and Secondary Highway Plan, Salt 
Lake County," on file with the development 
services division and made part of this chapter by 
reference, or other public street with does not 
conform to current county width standards, unless 
the portion of such lot or parcel within the 
right-of-way of the highway to be widened or 
additional required street width has been 
dedicated to the county and improved. The 
dedication and improvements shall meet the 
standards for such highway or street as provided 
in Section 15.28.060. [Ord 961 § 1 (part), 1986: 
prior code § 2-6-1] 
EXHIBIT 8 [2001 BENCH TRIAL, April 2001]. Emphasis added. 
[ATTACHMENT #1 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF] 
Attention should be given to the "title" of the 
section: "Dedication and improvement required" . That says it 
all. Both "dedication" and "improvement" are "required". The 
"dedication" is to be effected to the COUNTY. 
Attention given to the actual wording of the "highway-
abutting Ordinance" does not improve the COUNTY'S position: 
the operative textual provisions make the COUNTY'S position 
actually worse. Those provisions are clear: the "highway-
abutting" developer must, as a condition of development 
approval, "dedicate" AND "improve" the adjoining roadway, to 
its full width. Period. This is without regard for any 
actual or even imputed "impact" of the proposed development. 
9f> 
Pursuant thereto, B.A.M. which then owned real estate "to 
the centerline of the existing roadway" was required to 
make dedications and improvements having a cost and value of 
$391,000+ (1999 prices). 
The inequities and facially-obvious discriminatory 
result arising from application of the "highway-abutting 
Ordinance" are readily apparent from a simple reading 
thereof: 
1. The "exaction" (duty to dedicate property and 
to improve the roadway) is imposed only against 
"highway-abutting" parcels and their owners. 
2. Conversely, developers of parcels which are 
not "highway-abutting" have no such obligation to 
dedicate and install improvements. 
The COUNTY cannot avoid the foregoing simplistic analysis of 
its "highway-abutting" Ordinance; the Ordinance is so 
worded. Likewise, the COUNTY cannot deny, in this case, the 
disparate, disproportionate and discriminatory result the 
exaction imposed pursuant to the highway-abutting 
Ordinance inflicted upon the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT. 
The United States Supreme Court in Nollan vs California 
Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 107 SCt 3141 (USSCt 1987), 
noted: 
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the 
condition and the original purpose of the building 
restriction converts that purpose to something 
other than it was. The purpose then becomes, quite 
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simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some 
governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of 
"legitimate state interests" in the takings and 
land use context, this is not one of them. In 
short, unless the permit condition serves the same 
governmental purpose as the development ban, the 
building restriction is not a valid restriction of 
land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion. 
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. The COUNTY, requiring the 
exactions ONLY from "highway-abutting" parcels while 
simultaneously approving other traffic-generating 
developments not subject to the exaction, cannot 
successfully claim the exaction is necessary in lieu of an 
actual ban. In quite literal terms, the "highway-abutting 
Ordinance" is facially creating and constituting a 
"heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of 
the compensation requirement/ rather than the 
stated police power objective." 
107 SCt at 3151. Emphasis added. The Nollan Court continued: 
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to 
be more than a pleading requirement/ and 
compliance with it more than an exercise in 
cleverness and imagination,, As indicated earlier, 
our cases describe the condition for abridgement 
of property rights through the police power as a 
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State 
interest. We are inclined to be particularly 
careful about the objective where the actual 
conveyance of property is made a condition to the 
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that 
context there is a heightened risk that the 
purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police power 
objective. 
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. 
It is readily seen that the "purpose" of the COUNTY'S 
Ordinance (mandating the "dedication/improvement") of the 
highway, but imposed only against "highway-abutting" 
parcels, is simply, 
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. . . . the obtaining of an easement to serve 
some governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation, 
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. The "highway-abutting 
Ordinance" is that transparent. Coupled with the 
acknowledged practice that adjacent parcels are not 
required to make any dedication or undertake any 
improvements the "purpose" is simply to obtain increased 
roadway improvements, but without paying for those 
improvements. Such is not a valid governmental purpose, and 
Nollan and Dolan make that point clear. 
In Nollan the United States Supreme Court observed a 
factual setting which is exactly-on-point to this "dedicate 
and improve" situation created and mandated by the "highway-
abutting Ordinance". The Supreme Court wrote: 
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the 
burden of California's attempt to remedy these 
problems, although they had not contributed to it 
more than other coastal landowners, the State's 
actions, even if otherwise valid, might violate 
either the incorporated Takings Clause or the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
107 SCt at 3148. Footnote 4. Emphasis added. Citation to 
cases omitted. 
Such is exactly the situation here: the COUNTY-required 
"exactions" pursuant to the "highway-abutting Ordinance" 
have "singled out" the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT (and 
other similarly-situated "highway-abutting" developers) to 
"bear the burden of [Salt Lake County's] attempt to remedy 
these problems". Nollan, supra at 107 SC at 3148. 
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At this juncture there are two significant 
observations: 
1. The COUNTY has no "roads impact fee". Thus, 
there is no actual mechanism in place for the 
COUNTY to "capture" (undersigned's terminology) 
monies from those developments, which are NOT 
highway-abutting but which nevertheless "create" 
a similarly-situated "impact" upon the roadways. 
[This issue was the fundamental problem with the 
COUNTY'S "costs" defense: the COUNTY (through its 
witness, Mr Nepstad) could not then and cannot 
even now explain and answer this simple question: 
If B.A.M.'s relative share of the "costs" 
(to the "governments") is, as Nepstad 
states (albeit incorrectly), "five 
percent", from whence is the "other 
ninety-five percent" of the monies 
("cost") coming, if not from "taxation" 
sources (fuel taxes, sales tax)? Why do 
B.A.M.'s citizen-residents have to "pay 
twice" (now AND later)? 
2. Even IF the COUNTY had which it does not 
have a "roads impact fee", state statute 
expressly prohibits local governments (including 
the COUNTY) from having any "roads impact fee" 
which utilizes "state or federal roadways" as a 
basis upon which to calculate or collect the 
"impact fee". Section 11-36-102(13), Utah Code 
(effective since 1995). If the COUNTY is thus 
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statutorily-prohibited from even having such a fee 
for such "other" drivers and their vehicles, why 
is B.A.M. being singled out to provide and pay for 
improvements other developments do not have? 
These observations and arguments could also be raised 
against UDOT, if the COUNTY'S expansive "costs to the 
governments" interpretation is accepted. UDOT having no 
realistic ability to regulate development (i.e. UDOT doesn't 
issue building permits) has no realistic way of 
implementing a "roadway impact fee". Plaintiff B.A.M. would 
argue that such a situation including the legislative 
recognition that fuel taxes and other taxes pay essentially 
100% of UDOT's capital improvements budget is the prime 
reason for the statutory prohibition (against "road impact 
fees" for state or federal highways) of Section 11-36-
102(13), Utah Code. 
The exactions (dedications and improvements) required 
of the "highway-abutting" B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT but not 
required of similarly-situated developments (and their 
residents, drivers and vehicles) raise patently-obvious 
"equal protection" (under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment) and "uniform operation of laws" (under 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution) issues which 
the COUNTY is powerless to deny or refute. 
In the instant case, the COUNTY'S own witnesses 
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acknowledged that the subdivisions which are not "highway-
abutting" have no dedication and improvement requirement. 
Similarly, the COUNTY has no mechanism for "capturing" 
(undersigned's terminology) monies (such as through an 
impact fee) , to be utilized for the payment of those 
developments' impact. 
The COUNTY'S argument namely that the "highway-
abutting Ordinance" is uniformly applied to all "highway-
abutting" parcels is hollow and illusory: the true and 
invalid discriminatory effect of the Ordinance's hit-and-
miss, geography-based criteria of application is readily 
seen. 
Ill 
THE COUNTY-REQUIRED EXACTIONS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY 
UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF THE CRITERIA 
OF BANBERRY DEVELOPMENT VS SOUTH JORDAN CITY (1981) 
Even if the COUNTY'S misguided and incorrect self-
serving interpretation and application (namely, "costs to 
the governments") "expansion" (undersigned's terminology) of 
B.A.M, Ill's Paragraph 13's clear directive to the trial 
court (determine "costs to the County") is erroneously 
adopted and followed by the Supreme Court, the COUNTY'S 
position is nevertheless fatally flawed. The so-called 
"costs to the governments" (in this case, UDOT, as the 
governmental agency singularly responsible for the capital 
improvements to state roadways, including State Road 171) 
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are already covered and paid for by the "taxation" resources 
of UDOT through legislative appropriations. [Those 
"taxation" resources include the motor fuels taxes, vehicle 
registration fees, excise taxes upon rubber tires, 
distributions of federal funds from the national government 
(which themselves are "tax" revenues) , some sales taxes, and 
so forth. Those "taxes" represent and constitute an 
intentional legislative policy and practice for an across-
the-board, fair method of providing the funding source for 
state roadways. Those taxes are imposed in a uniform manner 
upon all citizens, based essentially upon usage. In that 
context, everyone pays, as contrasted with the B.A.M. 
situation wherein only "highway-abutting" persons pay 
actually "double pay" a second time because those persons 
have already paid or will in the future pay those roadway 
taxes to the State and the national government.] 
In 1981 the Utah Supreme Court decided the landmark 
case of Banberry Development Corporation vs South Jordan 
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah Supreme Court 1981), therein 
developing the "constitutional standard of reasonableness" 
for development exactions. In articulating the principle 
(i.e. the residents should not be required to "pay twice"), 
the Banberry court identified a 7-element test by which the 
"reasonableness" of an exaction or impact fee might be 
gauged. The Court wrote: 
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Among the most important factors the municipality 
should consider in determining the relative burden 
already borne and yet to be borne by newly 
developed properties and other properties are the 
following, suggested by the well reasoned 
authorities cited below: 
(1) the cost of existing capital 
facilities; 
(2) the manner of financing existing 
capital facilities (such as user charges, 
special assessments, bonded indebtedness, 
general taxes, or federal grants); 
(3) the relative extent to which the 
newly developed properties and the other 
properties in the municipality have 
already contributed to the cost of 
existing capital facilities (by such 
means as user charges, special 
assessments, or payment from the proceeds 
of general taxes); 
(4) the relative extent to which the 
newly developed properties and the other 
properties in the municipality will 
contribute to the cost of existing 
capital facilities in the future; 
631 P. 2d at 903-904. Emphasis added. Citation to supporting 
cases omitted. Elements #5 thru #7, being inapplicable to 
the present litigation, have been omitted. 
Concerning each of the four foregoing Banberry 
elements, the COUNTY whose burden it is to justify the 
exactions at bar through evidence (ala Mr Nepstad's 
testimony) or even argument failed entirely to address them. 
During the May 2010 bench trial NO evidence was ever adduced 
as to Element #1 "the cost of existing capital facilities". 
The Court will readily observed the applicability of 
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Elements ##2,3 and 4: that taxes have been traditionally 
utilized to pay for roads. No empirical evidence was 
presented on those Elements. 
In the instant situation, State Road 171 is a state 
highway. The capital improvements for that state highway 
come from appropriations made by the Utah Legislature, from 
revenue sources such as motor vehicle fuel and tires excise 
taxes, sales taxes, driver license fees, federal grants and 
revenue sharing, and other sources of state revenue. Under 
the Banberry "reasonableness" criteria ##1, 2, 3, and 4, 
the residents (and/or future residents of the Westridge 
Meadows subdivision [the B.A.M. project] HAVE ALREADY PAID 
and/or WILL PAY IN THE FUTURE through their Utah state 
gasoline fuel, tire excise taxes, etc their proportionate 
amount of the capital costs associated with the State Road 
171 (and for other roadways) . [The Westridge Meadows 
residents didn't unexpectedly appear out of thin air; they 
didn't arrive by spaceship from extra-terrestrial space. 
They were likely in Utah all the time. That they have 
relocated their residences to the new development does not 
change the simple fact that they have, in the past, paid for 
the state highway improvements and they will, in the future, 
continue to the pay for those capital improvements. These 
"taxation"-based revenues implemented and contemplated by 
the Utah Legislature represent an intentional and carefully-
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designed financing scheme to finance the construction and 
maintenance of state highways: those persons and entities 
which create the actual "impact" upon the state highways 
through their use thereof pay their proportionate share 
thereof through the fuel and other excise taxes to the state 
and federal governments, drivers license and vehicle 
registration fees, sales taxes, and other statewide revenue 
sources (not from COUNTY derived funding or sources3) . Thus, 
one hundred percent [100%] of B.A.M.'s expenses in complying 
with the COUNTY-required exaction should be reimbursed. 
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution 
expressly directs that the "taxation" and other charges 
("proceeds from fees, taxes, and other charges related to 
the operation of motor vehicles on public highways", as well 
as the fuels tax) be utilized for 
(b) the construction, maintenance, and repair of 
State and local roads, including payment for 
property taken for or damaged by rights-of-way . 
Article XIII, Section 5. 
3 
To the extent that the COUNTY utilizes any of its monetary 
resources for state highways which is certainly disputed and 
certainly has neither been claimed nor proved by the COUNTY 
those monetary resources are similarly derived from taxation 
sources from and against the citizens, even if derived from 
transferred monies received from the state and national 
governments. 
30 
State statute [Section 11-36-102 (13) (c) , effective 1995 
and thereafter] expressly prohibits local governments in 
this case the COUNTY from including in its "impact fee" 
derivations the impact upon federal or state highways. 
Although the COUNTY does not have a "roads impact fee" 
which arguably part of the B.A.M. problem, as only "highway-
abutting" persons are imposed upon by the COUNTY'S 
Ordinance, while similarly-situated developments creating 
the same roadway "impact" pay nothing the principle is 
sound: the Legislature recognizes that the fuels taxes and 
other "taxation" sources collected by the State pay the 
citizen's full share of the State Highway capital 
improvements expenses. 
What is particularly troubling in the context of the 
excessive exactions required of B.A.M. is the fact that Mr 
Nepstad testified that those B.A.M.-installed improvements 
are likely to be "ripped out" by UDOT when the State Road 
171 is finally improved by UDOT to its full width. See 
TRANSCRIPT. Page 161, Line 23. The "costs" therefor that 
is, for the re-installation of those improvements installed 
by UDOT will obviously come from "taxes" sources. Thus, 
B.A.M. residents have been forced to "pay twice" and that's 
not what Banberry says is to happen. [From a strictly 
"impact" analysis, the exaction has quite literally been 
"wasted", which raises serious "takings" questions: 
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government ought not be requiring an exaction which 
satisfies the need, only to have the improvement "ripped 
out" and replaced with a tax-paid improvement.] 
COUNTY "expert witness" Mr Nepstad indicated 
[TRANSCRIPT, 27 May 2010, Pages 171 through 174] that he 
relied on the 1998-published (by Wasatch Front Regional 
Council) "Long Range Transportation Plan 1998-2020" for much 
of his "expert" opinion. That document was admitted into 
evidence. EXHIBIT P-123. Page 98 of that document (exhibit) 
contains significant information, in the chart [Table VI-1] , 
for the 22-year period (1998-2020) : 
[EXHIBIT P-123, page 98] 
[ATTACHMENT #2 TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF] 
STATEWIDE REVENUE 
Federal funds 
Federal Highway Trust Fund $ 3,900,000,000 
Special Olympics funding 300,000,000 
State funds 
Highway User Revenues $10,625,000,000 
General Funds and bonding 1,900,000,000 
Other funds 
Innovative financing 62,500,000 
Total Statewide Revenue $16,787,500,000 
In a "do the math" analysis of the "evidence" Mr Nepstad 
conveniently overlooked) , it is evident that of the $16-
billion dollars of projected UDOT revenue for the 22-year 
period [1998-2010], only 62.5-million is projected to come 
from "innovative financing". [Narrative text within the 
document explains that "innovative financing" includes such 
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things as the "express lane surcharges" and "developer 
exactions".] Thus, mathematically, compared against the 
total of the projected UDOT revenues for the 1998-2020 time-
frame, the "developer exactions" (only a PART of the $62.5-
million) constitute but 0 . 372% that's not "three percent", 
but is rather "three-tenths of one percent" of the total 
projected UDOT revenues. The converse of that "mathematical" 
statistic is overwhelming: 99.6% of the projected UDOT 
revenues comes from "taxation" sources. Thus, whatever 
UDOT's budgeted expenditures for "capital improvements" for 
State Highways including State Road 171, if and when that 
roadway is ultimately improved, at the relevant location 
might be, those revenues will come almost completely (i.e. 
99.6%) from "taxation" sources, and Banberry is clearly 
implicated, if not violated.FOOTNOTE4 
The unrebutted testimony of Becky Bradshaw UDOT Comptroller-
--is consistent. Ms Bradshaw testified that the UDOT "audited" 
revenues for Fiscal Year 2009 were: 
Sales taxes $269-million 
Federal tax transfers 322-million 
State fuel taxes 337-million 
Vehicle registration, license fees 77-million 
Those "taxation sources" (readily-recognized and so 
characterized, for Banberry purposes) total to an amount equal 
to $1005 million ($1.005-billion). For the same period, Ms 
Bradshaw testified the total UDOT revenues were $1,091-
billion. [TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL, 27 May 2010, Pages 194 
through 196.] Arithmetically, the "taxation" revenues equal 
more than 92% of the FY 2009 UDOT budget: generally consistent 
with the WFRC-documented projections. 
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The "bottom line" although an "accounting" term 
widely-used in American vernacular and certainly applicable 
in this "costs to the County" setting from B.A.M. Ill is 
this: the "lion's share" (almost 100%) of the UDOT revenues 
come from "taxation" sources. [Intuitively, this would 
almost have to be the case.] Correspondingly, almost 100% of 
its expenditures for capital improvements would come from 
those same "taxation" sources. Whatever "clearinghouse role" 
the COUNTY advocates for itself see COUNTY'S "petition for 
rehearing" arguments preceding B^A.ML III that role (that 
the COUNTY must enforce exactions so that UDOT will have 
right-of-way and improvements) is simply not supported by 
the evidence; in fact, the evidence disproves the need for 
that role. 
The May 2 010 bench trial before Judge Toomey on remand 
was the COUNTY'S opportunity to provide evidence to the 
District Court on the "costs to the County". Instead, the 
COUNTY present its "expert witness" Mr Jon Nepstad, quite 
literally a "walk on" to the COUNTY'S defensive team. [Mr 
Nepstad had read about the B.A.M, III decision in the 
newspaper and recommended his professional services, which 
the COUNTY accepted.] 
That the COUNTY had NO "costs", as established in Point 
I, above, all of the testimony of Mr Nepstad concerning 
"costs to the government" (ala UDOT) is essentially 
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irrelevant. The Supreme Court in B.A.M. Ill said "costs to 
the County, absent the exaction" and the entirety of Mr 
Nepstad's testimony (concerning "costs to UDOT") is 
irrelevant. 
The "fatal flaw" in the Nepstad "expert witness" 
testimony is this: he presented not one iota, not a single 
scintilla, not a single sliver of "hard evidence" (or even 
"soft evidence" if there is such a thing) as to the COUNTY 
actually having any "costs" for the State Road 171. None. 
Not a single shred of evidence. All of his "testimony" as to 
the capital improvements expenses for State Road 171 was in 
what might be called "the passive voice" (of grammatical 
English): that is, there would be "expenses incurred by 
somebody" (not a quote, per se, from Nepstad) in the 
improvement of State Road 171, but that "somebody" was 
certainly not identified to be the COUNTY. 
Mr Nepstad's (and the COUNTY'S) failure to consider and 
evaluate Banberry's #1 criterion ["the cost of existing 
capital facilities"] is a fatal flaw for all of its 
analysis. 
Similarly, Mr Nepstad's testimony (explaining his cost 
projections: for example, $3.4-million to be paid for right-
of-way acquisition, the great majority of which goes for 
"total takings") confirms that "public funding" (that is, 
taxpayer-derived funds: "taxes" in some form) will be used 
35 
for those acquisitions. B.A.M.'s claims are valid. 
IV 
THE ENTIRETY OF THE COERCED EXACTION IS AT ISSUE 
This case, as noted, is an "inverse condemnation", 
filed pursuant to the "self-executing" provisions of the 
Utah Constitution: it seeks monetary reimbursement for the 
"excessive" exactions imposed upon the Plaintiff. B.A.M.'s 
litigation claims at trial and on appeal has always been 
consistent: that the exactions under the "highway-abutting 
Ordinance" were unconstitutional excessive. See, for 
example, Plaintiff's Complaint: 
15. The requirement of SALT LAKE COUNTY that a 53-
foot "half-width" roadway be dedicated and 
improved, as a condition of development approval 
of the "Westridge Meadows" development, without 
the payment of just compensation therefor, is 
arbitrary, capricious, without empirical 
justification or support, excessive, 
unconstitutional and in violation of law. 
Paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint, RECORD at Page 4. 
The COUNTY has argued and the District Court has 
essentially ruled that the scope of the award is limited to 
the so-called "thirteen feet" (from the so-called "forty 
feet" to the "fifty-three feet" dimensions) , as per whatever 
might have been limited by previous trial court (Judge Tim 
Hanson) and/or appellate court rulings, by reason of what 
might have been "appealed" to/from the County's 
administrative bodies is flawed and incorrect. Although 
theoretically overridden by Judge Toomey's ill-advised 
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*the highway abutting Ordinance specifies and 
requires exaction of the full amount. 
*the litigation situation is not merely that the 
highway-abutting Ordinance theoretically requires 
the full dedication, the COUNTY actually "took 
it". Thus, the filed litigation. 
*what B.A.M.'s original plat and/or other 
"paperwork" submitted as part of the application 
process was simply what B.A.M. was told to do, by 
COUNTY staff. The entire development approval 
process would not have gotten off of Square 0 had 
he come in with plat and papers at odds with what: 
the administrative staff charged with the 
enforcement and implementation of the "highway -
abutting Ordinance initially suggested. 
*the COUNTY was given the opportunity to leave the 
entire real estate in a "fallow" (undersigned's 
terminology) situation (no dedication, no 
improvements) put reserved for future UDOT 
acquisition and payment. In April-May 1998 the 
COUNTY expressly rejected this proposal by B.A.M. 
[This concept is discussed at length in the 
paragraph immediately following.] 
*the "notice of claim" analysis is flawed. No 
"notice of claim" is required as a prerequisite to 
an "inverse condemnation" claim. 
^following the litigation one year after the 
litigation had been filed in August 1998 in 1999 
the COUNTY required the installation of the 
"barrier fencing" along the northern boundary of 
the subdivision, thus denying to those residents 
(at least, to nine of them) "driveway access" onto 
State Road 171. Thus, the "internal roadways" were 
required, and the State Road 171 exactions were 
entirely "excessive". 
*the COUNTY itself felt that the Utah Court of 
Appeals decision in "B.A.M. I" was incorrect. The 
COUNTY itself sought to overturn "B.A.M. I" (on 
the "core" Dolan question) and filed a cross-
petition for certiorari review. The COUNTY ought 
not be allowed to rely upon a ruling it has 
challenged. 
*the "certiorari" review by the Supreme Court was 
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County" really doesn'' n p a n t^ac. 
Pen.ah:^ : '.p most si -in. : ; . -ai t- reason ^h^ '::;" 3 
a i' qumen. - \ n : posit i on A \ *-- * ' a v^n . t n ^  * f rnr< *• h^ - 1^T "K'r-7 " g 
£j - : .: — :..-_,_;.... :q., . : ,.. f 
a a n : j : i i s T * i t i v e l e v e l s ( A s s i s t a n t r ^ , n r v . ' . t - rnrn^y •"•- f * ' h . - - r p e 
c • ' . , L C L i ...i . .. f 
E '- '•. : nroposai :* ; <--n • -!- .oadwav ir^ a . * lal^ow" 
c i * 1 , s , e ar^a wmil d 
be ,:C "reserved" ;-n the uin! rcu u * ;::.n - arnoi^ir or ^r.1 
d'u -^-" op I ml i 11 y . . . : 
McCleai; TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TKIA. . ;f VJHV ?«':!;* R Q P 
S .i 
ainogeth-i .nc ..Uii.no tho^ it . qati' \ :i e COUNTY wr 11 o have 
" ::iyhwa\' -tbu* t i :ig Ordinandi'•' • n-r • • • ' ; ; M f c c • ... inav 
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Any limiting effect arising from B.A.M.'s "appeal of 
the administrative decision" (paraphrased) in June-July 1998 
time-frame is flawed and misplaced, for at least four 
reasons: 
1. The Plaintiff's "inverse condemnation" claims 
of "unconstitutional taking" are under the state 
and federal constitutions. The Utah Supreme Court 
has ruled that the provisions thereof for 
"inverse condemnation" proceedings are "self -
executing". Colman vs State Land Board, 795 P.2d 
622 (Utah Supreme Court 1990). No "notice of 
claim" is required as an administrative pre-
requisite to litigation. Hansen vs Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838 [Utah 1990] (it would 
unconstitutional to require a "notice of claim" 
filing as a pre-requisite to "inverse 
condemnation" claim). Thus, whatever was 
"appealed" from/to the County Commission in 1998 
is irrelevant for the Plaintiff's claims. [That 
Judge Hansen in both trials "got it wrong" in his 
refusal to consider anything other than from the 
"forty feet" line and upwards is not binding on 
this Court. Similarly, the COUNTY should not be 
heard to disingenuously ignore the effect of its 
own "highway-abutting" Ordinance, which has 
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2. T1' 
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determine the claims and L.SSU —•-
3 . Thi • *^; qntion was acLud- ' • ' % w ^ ' l 
REFOrr. ; ..c ! i ,i.-T i plat war finally approval ^.i.aisc 
200^j f h- T- at c o m a liavc been * r 
time, out the COUNTY wasn't changiny. T!;t- C\ L .V] Y 
should not now be heard f < " - " hairs" on 
con l i i ved issues w _ ; •,. , ;. i eievant 
a dm i i\ ist rar.ive pror^ss . 
th- .-UNTY ir-aiiirpd t^ • h--- i --taliation of the 
"i •:••;... ; :.. :the^n boundary of 
the subdivision, th^s eiiecLive^ preventing 
access thereto. With "driveway access" thus denied 
to those subdivision residents, the entirety of 
the State Road 171 improvements became 
unconstitutionally "excessive". 
The B.A.M. II [2006] decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court remanding the case back to the District Court for 
trial correctly applying Dolan avoided, once the threshold 
issue was resolved, meaningful discussion of the two 
"certiorari certified" (undersigned's terminology) issues 
(i.e. the "administrative remand" and a theoretical 
prerequisite to request a hearing, as expressly disavowed by 
Utah statute) which had been the jurisprudential 
justification for the B.A.M. II "appeal" (certiorari) and 
decision. 
Although the District Court's ruling in favor of the 
COUNTY essentially "skips over" this issue, the Supreme 
Court should nevertheless rule thereon. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN ITS REFUSAL TO RECEIVE PROFFERED TESTIMONY 
OF PLAINTIFF'S "REBUTTAL" EXPERT WITNESS 
The Dolan decision also makes it clear that the 
government has the burden of proof in establishing the 
validity of the exaction: 
Justice STEVENS' dissent takes us to task for 
placing the burden on the city to justify the 
required dedication. He is correct in arguing that 
in evaluating most generally applicable zoning 
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party challenging the regulation to prove tha" it 
c o n s t i t u t e s a n a r b i t r a r y r e g u 1 a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y 
rights. Here, by contrast, the city made an 
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's 
application for a building permit on an individual 
parcel. In this situation, the burden properly 
rests on the c:i ty. 
Foctnote- at . ] * . - ' - r ?^?o ^..phasis ^dded. 
A . - 'nnre^ni nrr the "cost ; .he 
County4 •••ii- wa.-r -;:t irelv ** i f »-v. t-' • > --'Uwtody a n d J< n.trc: <"'f 
t . i >r)nn t h e r • , o 
produce : hat "evidencer r.^TNOTP: r! :\P n r • t ^ d S t a t e s ^ n e i u e 
C * • i • : : - .; - ii h a s 
s i g r n f i < -i::t. sub^* ^i:t i v s ,mpUca^ h^r - - o r tr ie COUNTY and 
i i . - - • • . . i . i i d 
e x a c t i o i : r e q u i r e d b y M i - ' ?-: r.-.nce -4a'u = L b e n p r e s mieri,! to 
fji •"".:.• • • ••?: i egisiacion. ] 
The foregc :i i lg "l:::>i ii dei i" (• : f pi: oof • of per si lasi 01 1 ai id 
Th e COUNTY had i 101 w i t h s t a nd i ng "con t i i I U i i lg" d i s cov e r y 
requests requesting the production of documents supporting its 
"defenses" to Plaintiff s claims-- failed to produce any 
documentary evidence to Plaintiff Tl n is, Pi aintiff was not in 
possession of that "evidence11 and should not be expected to 
have any k.:i nd of "burden" to produce such evidence. 
More significantly, Plaintiff B.A.M. cannot have any kind 
of burden to produce testimonial or documentary "evidence" as 
to the "costs to the County", when such evidence does not 
exist, has never existed, and will not exist, because the 
County has no "costs" for State Road 17.1 , 
It is impossible to prove a negative, and B.A.M'. should 
not be expected to even have to try. Correspondingly, the 
COUNTY'S fa :i lure to produce any evidence on the "costs to the 
County" speaks volumes. 
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even of going forward with the evidence) has implications in 
the trial court's prejudicial denial not merely rejection 
or disbelief of the Plaintiff's offered testimony of its 
expert witness, Mr Craig Smith. 
Following remand of the case back to the District 
Court, the COUNTY claimed that "expert witnesses were 
necessary" to adjudicate the case. Although the Plaintiff 
disagreed with that "experts are needed" conclusion, both 
sides retained "expert witnesses". Although both "experts" 
prepared written reports which were submitted to the other 
party, neither party chose to depose the other party's 
"expert". 
A week or so before trial the COUNTY filed a "motion in 
limine", seeking essentially to disqualify the Plaintiff's 
"expert witness" from testifying. Essentially, the COUNTY'S 
motion was predicated upon the fact that Mr Craig Smith, an 
attorney, was not an engineer and thus was unable to 
formulate or render an "expert opinion" as to the compliance 
with the B.A.M. Ill directive. 
The COUNTY'S "disqualification" motion was argued to 
Judge Toomey on May 24th a mere two days prior to trial. 
Judge Toomey ruled, on "timeliness" grounds the motion was 
late filed against the COUNTY. 
Two days later, on the first day of the bench trial, 
Judge Toomey arguably in full awareness of the "case" (ala 
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evidence and then I'll determine what part of it 
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TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL, 26 May 2020. Page 44, lines 13-
22. Emphasis added. 
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;.imjneM • restrict his testiaiouy . J 
Given the Court's previous "I want to hear all the 
evidence" remark made during the introductory stages of the 
trial (May 26th), B.A.M. was led to believe the particular 
"order" of the presentation of witnesses was not going to be 
a problem. Likewise, given Dolan's attribution of the 
"burden" upon the government agency and the fact that Mr 
Smith had always been designated as a "rebuttal witness" 
(and the Court was aware of that "rebuttal" designation and 
had even ruled substantively on the County's "motion in 
limine" to exclude Mr Smith's testimony), B.A.M. and its 
counsel were reasonably led to believe the particular order 
or sequence of the witnesses would not be a problem. 
Given the Court's ultimate verdict entirely adverse 
to B.A.M. the Court's unexplained departure from "I want 
to hear all the evidence" and its resultant refusal to 
substantively hear Mr Smith's "rebuttal" testimony cannot be 
characterized by anything less than prejudicial, which 
prejudicial error should be remedied as part of this appeal. 
Although Mr Smith began his testimony, after a few 
minutes his testimony was cut-off by Judge Toomey, who 
denied further testimony from him. Her basis for ruling was 
that the "rebuttal expert witness" (the terminology 
consistently utilized in the run-up to the bench trial) Mr 
Smith should have called to testify earlier: "in the 
Plaintiff's case-in-chief". In a lengthy (not quoted 
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B.A.M. Ill "burden" through the testimony of its "expert 
witness", Mr Jon Nepstad. The Plaintiff B.A.M. had always 
characterized and designated Mr Smith as a "rebuttal" 
witness. Indeed, the COUNTY had utilized that same 
descriptive terminology. RECORD, at page 711. 
The Court's expectation (requirement) that Mr Smith 
should have been presented to testify "in Plaintiff's case-
in-chief" misapplies and fails to understand Dolan's 
"burden" requirement: 
1. First, the government has the burden of 
showing constitutional compliance. 
2. Secondly, until the COUNTY'S "expert witness" 
(Mr Nepstad) actually testified, there would be 
absolutely nothing to "rebut".FOOTNOTE6 
Considerable time would have been wasted in 
attempting to anticipate Mr Nepstad's expected 
testimony, only to perhaps have that testimony to 
change, thus prompting an additional "rebuttal". 
Until Mr Nepstad actually testified, there was nothing 
6 
It is anybody's guess what "foundation" and "not in evidence" 
objections which could have been raised had the "rebuttal 
witness" attempted to testify in advance. 
Furthermore, even though Plaintiff's counsel had been 
given the "expert's written report", there was no guarantee 
that his testimony would follow that report: in direct 
coverage as well as other testimony about issues not fully 
disclosed within his report. Considerable time would possibly 
have been wasted in "rebutting" issues which perhaps would 
have never been presented. 
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VI 
THE "NOTICE OF APPEAL" WAS TIMELY AND WAS WITHIN 
THE "EXTENDED" TIME-FRAME PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES 
AND UPON WHICH COUNSEL SHOULD BE ABLE TO RELY; 
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with B.A.M. Ill, the Court should conclude that B.A.M. is 
entitled to judgment in the full value of the exaction 
imposed against it. The COUNTY having failed in the 2008 
"petition for rehearing" to identify the needed 
"expansion/extension" of B.A.M. should not be heard to 
presently argue for such "expansion": in jurisprudence nor 
in the actual disposition of this case. 
Expenses for the capital improvement of state roadways 
come from statewide revenues (state and federal roadway 
taxes and other taxes) , as appropriated by the Utah 
Legislature. The in-kind exactions imposed not only in 
disregard of those "taxation" payments, but in disregard of 
the quantitative nature of those "fuel taxes" and so forth--
-are constitutionally "unreasonable", per Banberry. 
The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for 100% of its 
expenses incurred for the exaction (dedication and in-kind 
improvements) required pursuant to the "highway-abutting 
Ordinance": $391,000+, plus accrued interest. 
The Supreme Court should direct the District Court to 
enter judgment in favor of B.A.M., in the full amount of the 
$391,000+, plus accrued interest thereto. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of March, 2010. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 
CKPT1 FJ C/yVK 
X certify that T caused two copies of the foregoing 
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Salt Lake County District Attorney, Office of the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney, S-3600 Salt Lake County Government 
Center, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84190-201 ' this 21st day of March, 
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ATTACHMENT #1 
S^ I i i.nk" County "Highway-AijuLLJ.ii; 
EXHIBIT 8 [2001 TRIAL] 
Wasatch i.,,....» Regional Council 
"Long Range Transportation Plan" [1998] 
EXHIBIT #P-"m [part] [2010 TRIAL] 
IJ A M JII opinion 
196 P.3d HOI (Utah 2008) 
ATTACHMENT #4 
DISTRICT COURT 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
18 JULY 2 010j 
RECORD at 899-906 
EXHIBIT. 15.28.010 
Chapter 15.28 
HIGHWAY DEDICATION 
\ 111>i i s: 
t ^ X " 
.5.:&..,. 
i5.2S.0-. 
15.28.04i; 
15.28.050 
i - ^s nr-r 
15.28.070 
15.28.080 
:
 K tjieatiuii and impro\c:.iv..-
quired. 
if ions . 
!| jJJ ',KL'dUI'f 
Building permit issuance. 
I uu affected b> dedication 
Improvement ' *" s r j 
procedures. 
Appeal. 
Amendments to highway plan. 
i: equired, 
Except as otherwise provided in Section,. 
15.28.020, no building or structure shall be erec 
ted, reconstructed, structurally altered 01 
enlarged, and, no building permit shall be issued 
therefor, on any lot or parcel of land which abuts 
a major or secondary highway, as shown on the 
map entitled, "Official Major and, Secondar 
Highway Plan, Salt Lake Com ity,," 01 i f Lie * ith 
the development services division and made part 
of this chapter by reference, or other public street 
which does not conform to current county width 
standards, unless the portion of such lot or parcel 
within the right-of-way of the highway to be w id 
ened or additional required street width has been, 
dedicated to the county and improved. The dedi-
cation and i,i nprovements shall meet the stan-
dards for such highway or street as provided in 
Section 15.28.060. (Ord. 961 § 1, (part), 1986: 
prior code § 2-6-1) 
15.28.020 Exceptions. 
A. The maximum area required to I . _ J , 
cated shall not exceed twenty-five percent of ur 
lot or parcel, which was of record on the efleaiu 
date of the ordinance codified in this chapter u 
the county recorder's office. In determining th< 
amount of area required for dedication foi pur-
poses of this exception, any highway area which 
previously has been dedicated to the public 
through public use shall not be included 
B, Such required dedication shall not reduce 
t he lot or parcel to less than, five thousand square 
feet. 
L Dedicai:on shall :^i ix :chaired ;-r; ::.-.se 
portions i;;\j :ot occupied b\ d zvdin tn.iJa.ng 
existing on me effectne date • he ^\i:;^.AC 
codified in this chapter. 
D. Additional improvements shall not be 
i equired on a lot where paved surface, curb, gut-
ter and sidewalk improvements in good condi-
tion exist within the present right-of-way, unless 
i lse is changed from agricultural or single-family 
dwelling to a commercial, industriaJ, office or 
two-family dwelling or more. 
E. Dedication shall not be required, for 
i emodelings, additions and accessory buildings 
incidental to a single-family dwelling, used as a 
i esidence, existing on the lot as of the effective 
date of the ordinance codified, in this chapter, 
provided that no additional dwelling units are 
CXeat, ::!'d,. 
f ". Dedication shall not be required for addi-
tions or accessory buildings clearly incidental to 
a ma in, building existing on the lot as of the 
ei feet ive date of the ordinance codified in this 
chapter, provided that the cumulative floor area 
of all such additions and accessor*}' buildings does 
not exceed two hundred square feet or twenty 
percent of existing square foota*;\ whichever is 
greater. (Ord. 961 § 1 (part), 1 ** : prior code § 
2-6-2) 
15.2 8., 0 30 D e d i ca t i o n p r o c e d u i e. 
A Any person or other entity required to ded-
icate land in ider the provisions of this chapter 
shall execute an offer todedicateanda warranty 
ieed or other deed form acceptable to the county 
operly executed by all parties of interest in such 
erms as to be binding on the owner, his/her 
. - assigns or successor in interest. The offer to 
'ie. deed, and a title report shall be filed 
SALT l_AKb4&PUNi Y 
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Wasatch Front Regional council 
LONG RANGE 
TRANSPORTATION 
PLAN 
1998-2020 
Technical Report Number 36 
Table V]-] summarizes the amount of revenues projected to be available in the Wasatch Front 
Region over the next twenty years. 
Table VI-1 
STATEWIDE AND WASATCH FRONT REGION 
PROJECTED HIGHWAY REVENUES 
1998 - 2020 
I SOURCE 
1 STATEWIDE REVENUE 
Federal Funds 
Federal Highway Trust Fund 
Special Olympic Funding 
State Funds 
Highway User Revenue (less diversions) 
General Funds And Bonding 
Other Funds 
Innovative Financing 
Total Statewide Revenue 
Statewide Revenue Available For Wasatch Front Region 
AMOUNT | 
$3,900,000,000 J 
$300,000,000 J 
$10,625,000,000 || 
$1,900,000,000 J 
$62,500,000 1 
$16,787,500,000 | 
$8,512,500,000 
J LOCAL WASATCH FRONT REGION REVENUE | 
Federal Highway Trust Fund 
1 Class B&C Funds 
City And County General Funds 
Innovative Financing 
Total Local Wasatch Front Region Revenue 
Total Statewide And Local Wasatch Front Region Revenue 
$420,000,000 1 
$1,780,000,000 1 
$2,300,000,000 J 
$187,500,000 J 
$4,687,500,000 || 
$13,200,000,000 
TRANSIT SOURCES 
Revenues for transit service and improvements are available from several sources including federal 
funds, a local sales tax, fares, and others. Federal funds for transit capital and planning assistance 
are made available through the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). These funding programs are 
financed through the federal gasoline tax as well as from general fund monies. Revenues for transit 
improvements were projected using the assumption that local support for transit would increase to 
Salt Lake Urbanized Area Long Range Transportation Plan - Financial Plan Page 98 
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additional land for expanded roadway. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Depart-
ment, Timothy R. Hanson, J., found in 
favor of county. Developer appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, 87 P.3d 710, reversed 
and remanded with directions. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. The Su-
preme Court, Nehring, J., 128 P.3d 1161, 
held that the "rough proportionality" test 
governed county's exaction of portion of 
developer's property. The District Court, 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 
Timothy R. Hanson, J., denied developer's 
claim. Developer appealed. 
Holding: The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., 
held that court's "rough proportionality" 
analysis should have been a "rough equiva-
lency" test that compared respective costs 
of municipally required exaction and its 
impact to developer and county. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>842(9) 
Whether the proper analysis was applied 
by a trial court is a mixed question of law 
and fact. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>863 
When the legal concept of a case is 
easily defined and the case involves impor-
tant constitutional property concerns, the 
standard of review is correctness. 
2008 UT 74 
BAM. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company. Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic 
and political subdivision of the State 
of Utah, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20070137. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 24, 2008. 
Background: Developer appealed denial 
of license due to its objection to dedicating 
3. Eminent Domain <s=*2.10(7) 
"Rough proportionality" test to deter-
mine constitutionality of a municipally re-
quired exaction requires a "rough equiva-
lence" comparison of respective costs and 
impact of exaction on parties. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 5. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
4. Eminent Domain <S=>2.10(7) 
A court engaging in analysis of the con-
stitutionality of a municipally required exac-
tion must determine (1) whether the nature 
of the exaction and impact are related, (2) 
ATTACHMENT 3 
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whether the exaction and impact are related 
in extent, either by measuring cost to the 
municipality of assuaging the impact, or by 
measuring the value of the land to be dedi-
cated by the developer at the time of the 
exaction, and, (3) whether the costs to each 
party are roughly equivalent. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 5. 
5. Eminent Domain <£=>2.10(7) 
If the costs to each party are about the 
same, they are "roughly equivalent" for the 
purpose of analyzing the constitutionality of a 
municipally required exaction. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 5. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
6. Eminent Domain @=>2.10(7) 
To determine constitutionality of a mu-
nicipally required exaction, trial court should 
have carried out a "rough equivalency" anal-
ysis by comparing respective costs of munici-
pally required exaction and its impact to 
developer and county. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 5. 
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for plain-
tiff. 
Lohra L. Miller, Donald H. Hansen, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant. 
AMENDED OPINION 
WILKINS, Justice: 
111 Appellant BAM. Development alleges 
that the trial court incorrectly applied the 
"rough proportionality" analysis from Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 
2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), in examining 
whether an exaction required of the develop-
er by Appellee Salt Lake County was an 
unconstitutional taking. We hold that the 
trial court did not apply the correct analysis, 
and thus reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
11 2 In 1997, BAM. Development (B.A.M.) 
sought approval from Salt Lake County to 
build a residential development. The County 
informed B.A.M. that approval was condi-
Pacre 2 of 4 
tioned upon BAM. expanding the current 
width of the major road bordering the pro-
posed development (3500 South) from seven-
teen feet "half-width" (approximately 34 feet 
in total width) to 40 feet half-width. Later, 
in accordance with changes to the County's 
master traffic plan, the County told B.A.M. 
that it would be required to increase the 
street to 53 feet half-width. This additional 
exaction of 13 feet, B.A.M. alleges, repre-
sents an unconstitutional taking. 
113 After appealing the County's decision 
through administrative channels, B.A.M. 
sued the County, seeking either to escape the 
exaction or to receive just compensation for 
the alleged taking. After losing in the trial 
court, B.A.M. appealed to the court of ap-
peals and then to this court. 
114 In a prior decision on this same case, 
this court held that the trial court should use 
the "rough proportionality" analysis in Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 
2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), to determine 
whether the exaction was an unconstitutional 
taking. B.AM. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake 
County, 2006 UT 2, 1146, 128 P.3d 1161. On 
remand, the trial court again denied B AM.'s 
claims. BAM. now appeals from that deci-
sion. 
ANALYSIS 
[1,2] 11 5 The dispute between the parties 
is whether the trial court correctly applied 
the "rough proportionality" analysis from 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 
S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). Whether 
the proper analysis was applied is a mixed 
question of law and fact. In this case, be-
cause "the legal concept is easily defined" 
and because the case involves important con-
stitutional property concerns, the standard of 
review is correctness. State v. Levin, 2006 
UT 50, 111123-24, 144 P.3d 1096 ("Discretion 
is most confined—and the standard of review 
is nondeferential—when the legal concept is 
easily defined by appellate courts or when 
appellate courts erect strict fences for policy 
reasons."). 
116 In Dolan, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a municipally required exac-
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tion must be roughly proportionate to the 
impact of the development; otherwise, the 
exaction is an unconstitutional taking in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment. See Dolan, 
512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309 ("We think a 
term such as 'rough proportionality' best en-
capsulates what we hold to be the require-
ment of the Fifth Amendment"). The Dolan 
analysis requires a court to examine two 
factors, the exaction and the development's 
impact, and to determine whether the two 
are in rough proportionality. In this case, 
both parties effectively agree that one of 
those factors—the impact of the develop-
ment—is a 3.04% increase in traffic along 
3500 South. The parties disagree on the 
other factor, however, as well as whether the 
two are roughly proportionate.1 
11 7 A closer examination of Dolan clarifies 
how to determine whether the two factors 
are roughly proportionate. In Dolan, the 
Court looked first to how the states had 
approached the issue of exactions as uncon-
stitutional takings. See id. at 389-91, 114 
S.Ct. 2309. After examining various ap-
proaches, the Court stated that the "reason-
' able relationship" test, then being used in 
Utah2 and the majority of other states, was 
"closer to the federal constitutional norm" 
than the other tests. Id. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 
2309. The Court explained, however, that it 
would not "adopt it as such, partly because 
the term 'reasonable relationship' seems con-
fusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' 
wliich describes the minimal level of scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Instead, the 
Court held, "[w]e think a term such as 'rough 
proportionality' best encapsulates what we 
hold to be the requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment." Id. 
1. For example, the County argues that the exac-
tion i;> roughly piopoitionate to the impact be-
cause the exaction lepresents, alternatively, 
1.89% of the total land of the development, 
2.22% of the developers' available lots, 1.38% of 
the total area of the road after widening, or 
2.01% of the total expanded area of the road. 
B.A.M., on the other hand, argues that the exac-
tion is giossly dispioportionate to the impact 
because the exaction results, alternatively, in a 
300% increase in the road's carrying capacity, a 
300% increase m the road width, or a payment of 
100% of the toad improvement costs. 
v. SALT LAKE COUNTY Utah 603 
601 (Utah 2008) 
[3] 118 Of course, the Court did not mean 
rough proportionality at all. While 1 to 1 is 
a proportion, so is 1 to 1000, as any fifth 
grade student will be happy to tell you. Any 
two numbers, measured by the same units, 
form a proportion. So to be roughly propor-
tional literally means to be roughly related, 
not necessarily roughly equivalent, which is 
the concept the Court seemed to be trying to 
describe. The proportion of 1 to 1.01 is 
roughly equivalent, while the proportion of 1 
to 3 is not, for example. Unfortunately, by 
using the phrase "rough proportionality," the 
Court has engendered vast confusion about 
just what the municipalities and courts are 
expected to evaluate when extracting action 
or value from a land owner trying to improve 
real property. In this instance, rather than 
adopting the name chosen by the United 
States Supreme Court, we will use the more 
workable description of rough equivalence, 
on the assumption that it represents what 
the Dolan Court actually meant. 
119 After deciding on what to call the 
analysis, the Court explained what it en-
tailed: In order for an exaction to be consti-
tutional, a municipality must make some de-
termination "that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development." Id. 
(emphases added). The Dolan analysis thus 
has two aspects: first, the exaction and im-
pact must be related in nature; second, they 
must be related in extent. 
[4] 1110 A court engaging in a Dolan 
analysis must first determine, therefore, 
whether the nature of the exaction and im-
pact are related. One method that other 
courts have adopted to determine this rela-
tionship is to look at the exaction and impact 
in terms of a solution and a problem, respec-
tively.3 We agree that the impact is the 
2. See, e.g., Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan City, 
631 P.2d 899, 902-05 (Utah 1981). 
3. See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas County, 127 
Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738, 742 (1995) (stating 
that an exaction must be "reasonably calculated 
to prevent, or compensate for, adverse public 
impacts of the proposed development" (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Burton 
v. Clark County, 91 Wash.App. 505, 958 P.2d 343, 
354 (1998) ("[T]he government must show that 
its proposed solution to the identified public 
problem is 'roughly proportional' to that part of 
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problem, or the burden that the community 
will bear because of the development. The 
exaction should address the problem. If it 
does, then the nature component has been 
satisfied. 
Ull The second component of the Dotan 
analysis is whether the exaction and impact 
are related in extent This requirement im-
plies that both the exaction and the impact 
should be measured in the same manner, or 
using the same standard. The most appro-
priate measure is cost—specifically, the cost 
of the exaction and the impact to the devel-
oper and the municipality, respectively. The 
impact of the development can be measured 
as the cost to the municipality of assuaging 
the impact Likewise, the exaction can be 
measured as the value of the land to be 
dedicated by the developer at the time of the 
exaction, along with any other costs required 
by the exaction. Our trial courts are very 
adept at figuring out costs in similar situa-
tions, and are more than capable of adjudg-
ing the cost of each factor in this context 
[5] H 12 After determining the cost to 
each party, the final step of the extent com-
ponent of the Dolan analysis is simple: The 
trial court must determine whether the costs 
to each party are roughly equivalent4 Be-
cause each factor is measured the same way, 
in dollars, this calculation should be very 
simple. If the two sums are about the same, 
they are roughly equivalent for this purpose. 
[6] H 13 With this framework in mind, 
applying the Dolan analysis becomes a rela-
tively straightforward task. First, the trial 
court must determine whether the exaction 
and impact are related in nature—or wheth-
er the solution (the exaction) directly ad-
dresses the specific problem (the impact). 
Second, the trial court must determine what 
the cost of dealing with the impact would be 
to the County, absent any exaction; what the 
cost of the exaction would be to the develop-
er; and whether the two costs are roughly 
the problem that is created or exacerbated by the 
landowner's development."). 
4. As the Court noted in Dolan, exact equality 
between the factors is unnecessary. Dolan v. 
CuyofTtgard. 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 
129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) ("No precise matheinati-
equivalent The trial court, despite a valiant 
effort to divine the application of Dolan's 
"rough proportionality" test, did not correct-
ly apply the Dolan analysis because it failed 
to compare respective costs of the exaction 
and impact to the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
114 The Dolan analysis, properly applied, 
asks whether the imposition on the communi-
ty of a proposed development is roughly 
equal to the cost being extracted to offset it. 
We hold that the trial court applied the 
Dolan analysis incorrectly, and we reverse 
and remand the trial court's decision for 
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. 
1 15 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate 
Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice 
PARRISH, and Judge McHUGH concur in 
Justice WILKINS' opinion, 
116 Justice NEHRING does not 
participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge 
CAROLYN B. McHUGH sat 
( O f «Y NUMBtR SYSTEM a> 
cal calculation is required . . . . " ) ; see also Ban-
berry, 631 P.2d at 904 ("Precise mathematical 
equality 'is neither feasible nor constitutionally 
vital.' " (quoting Airwick Indus., Inc. v. Carls tacit 
Sewerage Auth., 57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18, 26 
(1970))). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 980908157 
DATE: JULY 8, 2010 
This action came before the Court for a bench trial on May 26, 27, and 28, 2010 
pursuant to an order of remand from the Utah Supreme Court. The issue on remand is 
"whether the imposition on the community of a proposed development is roughly equal 
to the cost being extracted to offset it." B.A.M. Devel., LLC. v. Salt Lake County, 2008 
UT 74, fi 14 ("B.A.M. II"). The Plaintiff, B.A.M. Development, LLC ("B.A.M."), was 
represented by counsel Stephen Homer; the Defendant, Salt Lake County ("the 
County"), was represented by Donald Hansen, Thomas Christensen, and Melanie 
Mitchell. 
Background 
B A.M. sought the County's approval to build a residential development. The 
1 
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County conditioned its approval on B.A.M. expanding the existing width of 3500 South, 
a major road bordering the proposed development Later, the County informed B.A.M. 
that it would be required to increase the street width even more. This additional 
exaction, which is a 13-foot wide strip running the length of one side of the property as it 
adjoins 3500 South, was the subject of B.A.M.'s appeal in which it contended that the 
exaction was an unconstitutional taking, and the decision of this appeal-BAM. //-was 
the remand that prompted the most recent trial in this case. The history of the case and 
the Utah Supreme Court's explanations and directives bear recounting. 
The Court action began when B.A.M. sued the County, asking either to avoid the 
exaction or to receive just compensation for the alleged taking. The Plaintiff's 
Complaint alleged causes of action for Unreasonable and Excessive Development 
Exactions; Uncompensated Taking of Private Property for Public Use; Violation of Due 
Process; Denial of Equal Protection Under the Law; Denial of Uniform Operation of 
Laws; Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and Non-Compliance with Statutory 
Requirements. Judgement for Defendant was entered July 30, 2001, with the Court 
finding no cause of action on any claim. 
After losing at trial, B.A.M. appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, and then to 
the Utah Supreme Court, ultimately securing a remand and a directive to this Court to 
use the "rough proportionality" analysis set forth in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994) to determine whether the exaction was an unconstitutional taking. Accordingly, 
this Court conducted another trial,1 at the conclusion of which it determined that all of 
'The first two trials in this matter were conducted by Judge Timothy Hansen. 
2 
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the Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice. This gave rise to another 
appeal, and as noted above, the B.A.M. II appellate decision produced the remand that 
brought the matter to trial in May 2010. 
In B.A.M. II, the Supreme Court considered whether, in the second trial, this 
Court correctly applied the rough proportionality analysis established by the Dolan case, 
and determined that it had not. The rough proportionality analysis is important because 
if the required exaction is not roughly proportionate to the impact of the development, 
the exaction is an unconstitutional taking. In prior proceedings, the parties agreed that 
the impact of the development is a 3.04% increase in traffic on 3500 South, but this is 
an apples to oranges comparison against the 13-foot exaction. 
The B.A.M. II decision offered some instruction for determining whether the 
exaction and the development's impact are roughly proportionate, explaining that 
"rough proportionality" is not what the United States Supreme Court actually meant, but 
"rough equivalence." This entails determining whether the required exaction is "related 
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." BAM II, U 9. 
Accordingly, the court must first determine whether the nature of the exaction and its 
impact-the burden the community will bear because of the development-are related.2 
Second, the Court must determine whether the exaction and impact are related in 
extent. The Supreme Court noted that this 
implies that both the exaction and the impact should be measured in the same 
manner, or using the same standard. The most appropriate measure is 
cost-specifically, the cost of the exaction and the impact to the developer and 
2The parties have stipulated that the nature component of the equation has been 
met. 
3 
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the municipality, respectively. The impact of the development can be measured 
as the cost to the municipality of assuaging the impact. Likewise, the exaction 
can be measured as the value of the land to be dedicated by the developer at 
the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the exaction. 
Id. fl 11. Finally, "[t]he trial court must determine whether the costs to each party are 
roughly equivalent." Id. fl 12. The Supreme Court forecast that this would be simple, 
and if the sums are about the same, then they are roughly equivalent. Precision is not 
required. 
This Court's assignment, then, was to "determine what the cost of dealing with 
the impact would be to the County, absent any exaction; what the cost of the exaction 
would be to the developer; and whether the two costs are roughly equivalent." Id. fl 13. 
In other words, "[t]he Dolan analysis, properly applied, asks whether the imposition on 
the community of a proposed development is roughly equal to the cost being extracted 
to offset it." Id. fl 14. The remand did not include a directive to consider B.A.M.'s 
claims for equal protection, uniform operation of law, or equitable estoppel. 
As indicated, the trial spanned three days; counsel subsequently submitted 
closing arguments in writing. The Court has read and considered these, and has 
reviewed the evidence from both previous trials, as well as the rest of the file, and the 
appellate court decisions and other authority cited by counsel. Pursuant to the Utah 
Supreme Court's directive in B.AM. //, the Court has evaluated B.A.M.'s claim using the 
rough equivalent standard, and makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 30, 1997, B.A.M. submitted to the County an application and proposed 
4 
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plat for the development of a proposed subdivision known as Westridge 
Meadows ("the Subdivision"), and located at approximately 7700 West and 3500 
South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. 
2. At the times relevant to this action, 3500 South was owned by the State of Utah 
and managed by the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). The 
ownership of public roads occasionally changes, however, as the result of a 
legislative "jurisdictional transfer" or by operation of law through annexation and 
incorporation of municipalities. 
3. The proposed plat for the Subdivision included a 40-foot highway dedication 
along 3500 South, which is on the north boundary of B.A.M.'s property. 
4. Salt Lake County's engineering and development staff approved B.A.M.'s 
proposed subdivision on August 26, 1997, subject to compliance with County 
road standards, including a 40-foot highway right-of-way dedication of land 
where the subdivision parcel abuts 3500 South. 
5. On June 23, 1998, the County planning commission preliminarily approved 
B.A.M.'s amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication along 3500 
South. 
6. On July 2, 1998, B.A.M. appealed the 53-foot right-of-way requirement to the 
Salt Lake County Board of County Commissioners. 
7. The Board of County Commissioners denied B.A.M.'s appeal on July 15, 1998. 
8. On June 23, 1999, the County planning commission approved B.A.M.'s 
amended subdivision plat, which had been modified to include the required 53-
foot dedication. 
5 
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9. The Board of County Commissioners granted final approval of the plat on August 
18, 1999, and the plat was recorded in the Recorder's Office on August 27, 
1999. 
10. B A M . constructed the subdivision. 
11. In April 1998, County transportation engineer Andrea Pullos analyzed historical 
and projected traffic volumes on 2500 South in the "traffic link" between the 
intersecting cross streets 7200 West and 8000 West, an area in which the 
Subdivision lies. 
12. Ms. Pullos's analysis used historical traffic data compiled by UDOT that showed 
increasing traffic volume on 3500 South between the traffic link. She compared 
the anticipated traffic volume increase that would be created by the Subdivision 
with the amount of B.A.M.'s land that the exaction would require B.A.M. to 
dedicate for future highway right-of-way. 
13. Ms. Pullos concluded that the two were roughly proportionate. 
14. In the period during which the Subdivision application was pending, local growth 
and development in this area was expected to continue, generating increased 
traffic volume on 3500 South. 
15. WFCR anticipates responding to this increased growth by widening existing 
roads, and also widening the traffic link. The cost of the project in 1998 dollar 
values is $6,748,700. 
16. The road-widening projects will likely be financed by a combination of 
government road construction funding sources, including federal highway funds 
and additional State, County, and/or municipal funds. 
6 
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17. Comparing the total expected increase in traffic by the year 2020 with the portion 
of the vehicle trips attributable to the Subdivision, the portion of the $6,748,700 
total cost that is directly attributable to the Subdivision is 5%, or $337,500.00. 
18. This sum reflects the cost to the public of responding to the increased traffic 
likely to be caused by the Subdivision. 
19 B.A.M.'s costs resulting from the 13-foot exaction are as follows: 
a. land lost from the decrease in lot sizes for 9 lots: $10,407.29 
b. additional pavement costs $10,140.00 
c. power pole relocation costs $23,250.00 
d. fees for re-engineering $12,450.00 
e. excavation costs $ 5,400.00 
f. tree removal costs $11,175.00 
Total: $83,997.29 
20 Although B.A.M. has attempted to challenge the entire highway right-of-way 
dedication and to include in the exaction the incidental development costs of 
installing curb and gutter, fencing, storm and sewer lines, the only issue it 
appealed to the County Board of Commissioners was the requirement of a 53-
foot dedication rather than a 40-foot dedication. Accordingly, the only issue 
before this Court was the additional 13-feet exacted by the County. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The scope of this remand was to determine whether the additional 13-foot 
exaction of land required by the County was an unconstitutional taking of private 
property without just compensation. The impact cost and the exaction cost were related 
in nature. The Court has employed a rough equivalency analysis, comparing the 
monetary cost of the relevant government-imposed exaction to B.A.M.-$83,997.29-with 
the government's monetary cost-$337,500.00-and determined that because the cost to 
7 
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the community is significantly higher than the cost to B.A.M. of the exaction, there has 
been no taking. 
In reaching these conclusions, the Court has taken into account B.A.M.'s 
argument that paragraph 13 of the B.A.M. //decision confined this Court to considering 
only the cost to the County. The County points to paragraphs 10 and 14, and the Utah 
Supreme Court's elimination of footnote 5 in the decision that preceded B.A.M. /, in 
support of its contention that what the Court should examine is the cost to the 
community. Based upon the arguments set forth in the County's Closing Argumentjhe 
Court concludes that this approach is more persuasive. 
ORDER 
The County is to submit a proposed form of judgment at an appropriate time 
pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this Tdav of J u X ^ , 2010. 
KATE A, TOO 
DISTRICT CO 
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